Federal court case law 4th quarter 2025

The Federal Supreme Court ruled on two appeals in connection with years of serious abuse of a daughter by her father (B.A.) and stepmother (A.A.) between 2011 and 2019. Both were convicted of grievous bodily harm (Art. 122 para. 3 SCC) by the District Court of Zurich. The Zurich High Court essentially confirmed the judgement and imposed prison sentences of 5 years for the father (with expulsion) and 4 years for the stepmother. Both appellants challenged the judgement of the High Court, but only with regard to the sentencing (and, in the case of the father, also the deportation). The unappealed parts of the judgement will become final - subject to Art. 404 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgement of the Federal Supreme Court clarifies the case law on the limitation of cognition in the case of a partial appeal (Art. 399 para. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). The appellant waives a comprehensive review or restricts the appellate court's power to review the facts of the case if he only challenges the sentencing. The Federal Supreme Court therefore confirms that a limited appeal does not permit a covert retrial of the conviction. It also clarifies the strict application of the hardship clause in the case of mandatory expulsions for serious violent offences within the family.

In judgement 6B_1297/2023, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed the conviction against A. for assault (Art. 134 SCC) and the five-year expulsion from the country. In 2017, the appellant had mobilised an armed group of around 25 people to carry out an organised attack on a smaller group of people in Thun, in which several victims were seriously injured. The Federal Supreme Court ruled that an attack was also deemed to have taken place if the victims defended themselves and rejected the existence of a scuffle. There was no arbitrary determination of the facts. The asserted integration and family ties (marriage and child) did not constitute a case of severe personal hardship (Art. 66a para. 2 SCC), as the family was founded in the knowledge of the threat of deportation and the public interest in the deportation outweighed the seriousness and brutality of the offence. The general geopolitical situation in Syria does not constitute a definitive obstacle to enforcement. There is no concretely demonstrated individual danger to the life and limb of the appellant that would prevent the order of expulsion. The Federal Supreme Court dismissed A.'s appeal.

In its judgement 9C_113/2025, the Federal Supreme Court ruled on the inheritance tax of a man who inherited half of a childless woman's estate (around CHF 1.9 million). He claimed to be the biological nephew of the deceased - the son of her brother, a deceased Catholic priest - and therefore entitled to the reduced tax rate of the "parental line". However, the municipality of U. taxed him as a non-relative at 40 %. The Federal Supreme Court initially confirmed that the basic facts of the Lucerne Inheritance Tax Act (Section 3 para. 1 lit. a EStG/LU) presuppose a relationship recognised under civil law, which did not exist in this case due to the lack of a judicial determination of paternity. It therefore considered the cantonal court's interpretation to be constitutionally correct. On the other hand, it criticised the fact that the supplementary facts (§ 3 para. 2 EStG/LU), which also cover "illegitimate blood relatives", had been completely disregarded by the lower court. This must now be examined, taking into account the DNA report and a clarification of the term "entitled to inherit". The proceedings were referred back to the municipality for a new assessment.

In judgement 2C_657/2023, the Federal Supreme Court had to decide whether tender documents in the invitation procedure are independently contestable under the new IVöB. The starting point was the awarding of winter maintenance work by the municipality of Surses, in which A. SA came away empty-handed and complained that the price weighting of 30 per cent was inadmissibly low. The Graubünden Administrative Court dismissed the complaint because, in its opinion, the complaint had been raised too late. The Federal Supreme Court clarified that an invitation to submit an offer in the invitation procedure does not constitute a call for tenders within the meaning of Article 53 IVöB and that the tender documents are not an independent object of appeal. Bidders can therefore only contest deficiencies in the tender documents when the contract is awarded, not when the invitation is received. The Administrative Court had therefore wrongly judged A. SA's complaint to be late. The appeal was upheld and the judgement of the lower court was annulled.

In judgement 4A_251/2025, the Federal Supreme Court had to decide on the admissibility of the so-called possible passive litigation consortium and the validity of an authorisation to sue pursuant to Art. 209 ZPO. The starting point was a dispute between a shoe manufacturer and a freight transport organisation after numerous containers with shoes were lost during sea transport. The plaintiff had initially included the Swiss subsidiary of the transport company in the arbitration proceedings and later also named the parent company as a contingent defendant. The Justice of the Peace Office then issued a licence to sue, which included both companies. However, the action was later only brought against the parent company. The lower courts did not intervene in the action as they considered the authorisation to sue to be invalid due to an inadmissible potential joinder of parties or an inadmissible change of party. The Federal Supreme Court rejected both arguments. It confirmed that a possible passive joinder of parties is permissible under Swiss civil procedure law as it serves the cause of substantive justice and does not constitute an inadmissible conditional action. There was no change of party, as the plaintiff had merely added an additional party and had thus undertaken a permissible subjective accumulation of claims. It upheld the appeal, overturned the decision of the Cantonal Court of Basel-Landschaft and referred the case back to the court of first instance for a substantive judgement.

The Federal Supreme Court had to decide whether manufacturers of plant-based meat substitutes are allowed to use animal species names such as "chicken" or "pig". The starting point was a dispute between the Federal Department of Home Affairs (FDHA) and Planted Foods AG, whose products had been criticised by the Zurich Cantonal Laboratory. The Zurich Administrative Court cancelled the objections, whereupon the FDHA lodged an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court. The court clarified that, according to the Foodstuffs Act (LMG) and the associated ordinances, labelling must correspond to the facts and must not mislead about the composition or origin of a product. Animal species designations are part of the legally regulated labelling for products of animal origin and may therefore only be used if the food actually contains ingredients of this animal species. References to the plant origin or additions such as "from plants" do not change this. The court relied on Art. 18 and 19 LMG, Art. 14 LGV, Art. 9 VLtH and EU case law (including the "TofuTown" judgement). It emphasised that protection against deception takes precedence over marketing considerations and that the ban applies regardless of language or form of presentation. The designations were categorised as inadmissible. The Federal Supreme Court upheld the FDHA's appeal, overturned the judgement of the Administrative Court of Zurich and confirmed the ruling of the Directorate of Health that animal species designations may not be used for vegan products.

In this judgement, the Federal Supreme Court deals with a dispute arising from a collective daily sickness benefits insurance policy under the Federal Insurance Contract Act (VVG). The appellant is A. AG (insurer), the respondent is B. (insured person). The central question was whether a contractual exclusion of a transitional period in the event of job-related incapacity for work is legally permissible if the insured person is only to change jobs and not change professions. The Federal Supreme Court emphasised its consistent case law, according to which the granting of an appropriate transition period (typically 3-5 months) for professional adjustment and job search applies not only to a change of occupation, but also to a change of job. During this period, daily allowances are to be paid based on the incapacity to work in the original occupation. Although Art. 38a VVG can be contractually specified in this respect, this must not lead to unreasonable obligations. The disputed AVB clause, which generally and absolutely excludes any transitional period in the event of a change of job, contradicts the judgement of the Federal Supreme Court and the principle of good faith. It exacerbates the duty to minimise damages in an impermissible manner. In the specific case, it was unrealistic and unreasonable for the respondent to find a new job immediately under the given circumstances (short notice, public holiday, still existing employment relationship). A general exclusion of the transitional period ignores this necessary examination of concrete realisability. The Federal Supreme Court confirmed the judgement of the lower court, according to which the respondent was entitled to a two-month transitional period for the change of job, and dismissed the insurer's appeal.

Health insurance The Federal Supreme Court ruled that disability insurance (IV) is not obliged to cover the costs of structural adaptations to the home of a paraplegic cross-border commuter in France. The insured person, who had previously worked in Switzerland, applied to have the costs of the disability-friendly conversion of his house in France covered. The IV office for insured persons abroad rejected the application, while the Federal Administrative Court ordered the IV to cover the costs. The Federal Supreme Court overturned this judgement and confirmed the IV office's refusal. It ruled that rehabilitation measures and aids as benefits in kind may only be granted in Switzerland (territoriality principle). There is no obligation to export such benefits abroad (E. 3.4). Exceptions under Art. 9 IVG and Art. 23bis IVV must be interpreted restrictively and are only permissible if it is objectively impossible to implement the measure in Switzerland or if there are particularly important reasons (E. 5). In the opinion of the court, the fact that the insured person's home is in France does not constitute a significant reason. The application for free administration of justice was therefore rejected due to a lack of evidence of need.